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Abstract.  
The  argument made here runs counter to that often found in the more mainstream literature on the 
China-Russia relationship. This literature is of course both varied and rich.  It does not tell a single 
story. But amongst a very large number of experts the view has been - and in many respects remains 
– that there will always be much more that will divide Moscow and Beijing  than unite  them. This I 
suggest is not only contradicted by an increasingly large body of evidence: it also runs the very real 
risk of misunderstanding the geopolitical challenge facing the United States and its allies in both 
Europe and Asia. This is not to be alarmist. The US and its allies still retain formidable advantage. Nor 
for a moment am I suggesting that we are in the midst of some new  - largely mythical -   Cold War 
with the West facing some new axis of authoritarian evil.  But it is to suggest that unless we call 
things by their right name,  there is a very real chance that two very illiberal powers who pose an 
important challenge to the West (and do so more effectively together than apart) could make  hay 
while the democracies go on reassuring themselves that there is very little to be concerned about  
because  China and Russia  are bound by their character, culture and history  to be  enemies rather 
than  friends, competitors  rather than what they have in fact become: strategic partners.  
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Introduction 
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“Appearances are deceiving. The self-styled “strategic partnership” may look in the pink of health, but 
beneath the surface there are serious contradictions”. Bobo Lo. ‘A Partnership of Convenience’ The 
New York Times, 7 June, 2012.  
“Both sides talk up ties rhetorically, but China and Russia are unlikely to forge a sustained strategic 
partnership”. Ali Wyne, ‘The Limits of China-Russia Co-operation’, The Wall Street Journal. 22 May, 
2014.  
“So, even if they agree to work together on an equal footing, reality will inevitably reshape their 
cooperation framework”. Constantinos Filis. ‘Could a Chinese-Russian Strategic Partnership 
Challenge the Power of the West?’ LSE US Centre. (online) June 20, 2015 
“Some indications that China and Russia are no longer fast friends are subtle. Others could hardly be 
clearer”. Motohiro Ikeda, ‘China-Russia Rift may help other ties bloom’, Nikkei Asian Review. 
April 11, 2016.  
------------------------ 
If  China’s  modern relationship with the United States has received more than its fair share of 
attention – too much  some might complain in both Asia and Europe 1 - the same could hardly 
be said until very recently of its complex relationship with another  important  state with 
which it has had an even closer  history:  Russia. This is surprising. After all, the two 
countries share one of the longest land borders in the world. The old USSR  was for many 
years a close ally of  the Chinese Communists. And though Russia may have abandoned 
communist rule  - while China  has not -  the two  today appear to be on excellent terms,  so 
much so that China is now regarded by Putin  as Russia’s indispensable friend while  Russia 
and its much feted leader is now viewed in China in the most positive terms imaginable.
2
  But 
in spite of the mounting evidence that the two have formed what even they now call a 
‘strategic partnership’,  there are still many who doubt whether the relationship is an 
especially  secure one. Indeed, the majority view  would still seems to be  what it was some 
time back: 
3
 namely, that  even though relations might have improved,  and in some areas 
improved dramatically, more will always divide  the two countries than unite  them.
4
 As one 
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expert  noted  only a few years ago, even though things  between the two sides had  got better, 
the relationship would, and could, never become a close one.
5
  Nor was this his view alone. 
As another writer suggested in a much cited study  followed two years later by a wide –
ranging paper on the same subject,  the relationship would for ever remain  ‘non-committal 
and asymmetrical’:  ‘convenient’ for both sides to be sure,  but nothing we  should be 
especially impressed by.
6
  In fact, Bobo Lo’s underlying argument– that the character, culture, 
history and interests of these two countries were   just too different for them to make common cause – 
is one  which seems to have been adopted by most  experts. Thus we are regularly informed   that  
the two countries are less friends than rivals (especially when it comes to  Central Asia); 
7
  
that  the Russians and the Chinese just  don’t like one another (call it cultural 
misunderstanding if you will);  and  that while many policy-makers in  Beijing view the 
Russians with contempt,  the Russians themselves view China with a mixture of  awe  
(because of its economic success) and fear (because it is doing so much better than Russia).
8
  
Nor we are told would either be prepared to sacrifice  their  more important ties  with  the 
western capitalist economies for the dubious benefits of working closely with the other. Their 
own economies are not especially complementary either.
9
  And to cap it all, there is, we are  
informed, a growing and deepening power gap between the two which must inevitably push 
the two  apart. Geoff Dyer has perhaps  expressed this idea more eloquently than most. China 
and Russia he notes are both power obsessed states. But one of those powers is on the up – 
obviously China – while the other, Russia, is on the way down. This he  then goes on to argue  
can only feed Russian anxieties; and as those anxieties grow,  Russia will pull back from a 
dependency relationship on a China it once regarded as its little brother and whose rising 
power it fears. The two are thus destined to be very uneasy bedfellows at best, rivals at worst,.  
All talk of a new strategic partnership  therefore is so much hot air.
10
  
In what follows  I want to challenge this still dominant view.
11
 I  do so not because  there are 
no differences or potentially conflicting interests between China and Russia. That would be 
plainly absurd. Rather I  do so for a rather different reason,  which is  to explain what the 
various sceptics seem unable to: why  it is that these two  powers have  managed to form an 
increasingly close relationship  in spite of all their obvious differences. I also want to contest  
the view  – once put forward by liberal theorists with greater confidence than it is now – that 
Russia and  China  would in time be  effectively incorporated into  that essentially western  
construction  known as the  ‘international community’. Clearly this has not happened, or has 
happened only very partially. Admittedly, neither country sees any alternative but to work 
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inside that most important of all western institutions known as  the world market;  nor do 
either really pose a  serious ideological threat to the West.
 12
  Yet they clearly oppose  the  
West in a number of significant ways. Most obviously, they are   hostile to the distribution of 
power within an international system which they believe works to their disadvantage while 
privileging the position of the West and the United States. They are also less than willing to 
play by a set of  rules which take it as read that in the modern world there  is  simply no room 
for some  latter-day version of the Monroe Doctrine - whether this be expressed in Russia’s 
case by its claims to have rights in its own ‘near abroad’  or in China’s by its sovereign claims 
to most or all  of the East and South China seas. Politically moreover neither accept the very 
basis upon which the contemporary western order is built: liberalism. Nor is this all. As 
Rozman has pointed out, in a series of brilliant studies,   though the identity discourse in the 
two systems is  different, it is not that different. On the other hand, it is vastly different to that 
which  pertains in the West. 
13
  Now none of this taken together  adds up to what we might 
term classic balancing behavior. Indeed,  even Putin denies that Russia and China are seeking 
to form a new military bloc.
14
  The Chinese are more careful still,  and even avoid using the 
term  alliance to describe their relationship with Russia.
15
 Nonetheless, it is impossible to 
ignore the by now self-evident fact that what increasingly binds the two  together – more so 
than ever since the great financial crash of 2008 followed three years later by the US ‘pivot to 
Asia’  and  the  subsequent breakdown in relations between Russia and the West  -  has 
become increasingly more important than what separates  them.  Naturally, this  does not 
mean they do not have other interests, including in China’s case a very great interest in 
exporting as much of its  capital and goods to the rest of the world. But this does not detract 
from the main argument being advanced here:  namely, that China which   has so few serious 
friends in the world today appears to have found something close to one in Russia,  and that 
Russia – increasingly  isolated from the West and in need of as much support as it can muster 
-  has clearly  discovered one in China.
16
  
To make good on my claim (one I would suggest that it is now claiming more adherents) I 
have divided the essay into several  parts. In the first  section I take a brief look at history or 
more precisely at how both countries look at two events which have shaped their evolution 
ever since: the second world war and  the  collapse of the USSR. History, I suggest,   not only 
matters a great deal to both countries.  That much is obvious. But  these two historical 
’moments’  in particular help define the way in which both Russia and China today view the 
world  and  indeed one another.  In part two I  then look at their positions on international 
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affairs, focusing in particular on their critique of  American power and US policies in the 
world system. In part three I  go on to look at four  key areas where  China and Russia  now 
cooperate  regularly: inside the P5 of the UN;  as part of the Shanghai Co-operation 
Organization; within the BRICS organization;  and  over their  preferred trade  architecture for  
the Asia Pacific.  
Finally, I  reflect on the future in the light of the crisis in Ukraine. Here I differ from those 
who seem to think that the crisis has exposed deep fault lines in the Sino-Russian relationship. 
I  take a rather different view, which, stated bluntly, is that  the crisis has revealed something 
quite different: namely that China  has been  prepared to ignore certain  basic principles in 
order to   maintain its relationship with Russia, while Russia  has been more than willing to 
appease China  in order to make sure it can keep the Chinese on their side. Naturally, nothing 
is over-determined.  But if one were to make  a  prediction (a fool’s errand to be sure)  it is 
that a Russia under increasing siege from what it now perceives as being  a permanently 
hostile  West,   and a China confronted by  an America that stands as the principle obstacle to 
its ambitions in Asia-Pacific,  have come to the not illogical  conclusion that there is nothing 
to lose, and  probably much  to be gained, from moving even closer together. That this 
presents  a challenge to the West is obvious. Whether though it turns into an existential threat 
remains to be seen. This I suggest will  depend just as much  on how the  United States and 
the West  respond  to this challenge as it will on  policies pursued by  Moscow and Beijing. 
And here  there may be interesting lessons to be learned from the Cold War. As we now 
know, US intransigence tended to push the two communist countries together - or at least did 
until Washington played  an altogether different game and devised a strategy which then 
helped pulled them apart. We are clearly no longer living through  a Cold  War. But the West 
still needs to devise an effective strategy. However, before  it can do so it has to know what it 
is it is facing rather than taking comfort in  the idea that we can just wait for  China and 
Russia  to drift apart because their relationship is,  as some sceptics insist, ‘vulnerable,  
contingent and marked,,,by uncertainties’. 17  If only it were that simple. We  certainly don’t 
have to hyperventilate about the relationship. On the other hand,  we do ourselves no favours 
if we blithely dismiss it    as if it were some ‘temporary meeting of minds’ or a mere ‘axis of 
convenience’ devised by tactically shrewd policy-makers in Moscow and Beijing who today 
claim  they are friends,  but who will in time – we are reasssured - be pulled apart by forces 
they probably don’t understand and by the tragic logic of a great power rivalry over which 
they have little or no control. 
18
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History  
"“The People’s Republic of China and Russia are more aware of the world’s 
problems than the United States because they have  gone through terrible wars 
unleashed by the blind egoism of fascism,” Fidel Castro.19 
One of the basic reference points in the ongoing debate about the durability of the China-
Russia relationship is of course what happened in history,  or more exactly what happened in 
their history to create what many  still  believe is a  serious  barrier to the establishment of 
trust between the two.  The list of grievance on the Chinese side in particular is indeed a long 
one, going right back to the unequal treaties of the 19
th
 century,  through  Stalin’s efforts to 
stop the CCP coming to power in 1949,    and on to the great split  between the two 
communist states  between the early 1960s and the late 1980s.  Yet history as we know is 
always contested terrain, and one could just as easily make the case that the past has the  
potential to unite  the two countries rather than divide them.  After all, if  it had not been for 
the USSR,  the Chinese Communist party would never have come into being in the first place; 
and  though Stalin was never less ambiguous about Mao, in the end the Soviet Union did 
provide the PRC with massive support  in its early formative years. Moreover, the USSR and 
China did fight on the same side in World War II, a fact the world was  graphically reminded 
of in 2015 when the Chinese President was guest of honour in Moscow standing next to Putin 
as the tanks and troops rolled by during the victory parade. Four months later Putin  then 
attended another massive event in Beijing celebrating  China’s victory over Japan. The two 
leaders also used these  deeply symbolic occasions  not just to recall  times gone by,  but to 
demonstrate how far their relationship had improved in more recent years.  Indeed, Xi’s visit to Russia 
and his appearance at the Moscow commemorations according to one Chinese official ‘pushed the 
China-Russia all-round strategic partnership relationship to a new level’,  while Russia’s equally 
active  participation in China’s celebrations according to Putin himself marked   yet another major step 
forward in a fast  maturing relationship. 
20 
But it is  not just the war that unites  the two. So too does a more recent event: the collapse of 
the Soviet project itself between 1989 and 1991. The reasons why a once mighty  superpower 
with an extensive industrial  base, a  huge military capability, and a powerful apparatus of 
controls finally imploded has been analysed at length in the West. However, the collapse of  
Soviet  communism has perhaps  been of  even greater interest to those states directly and 
indirectly involved  themselves,  namely Russia  and China. The official line in Russia 
initially  was that that the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the USSR   were more or 
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less  inevitable given the burdens of empire and  the  more efficient character of their 
capitalist competitor. But all was not lost it was felt.  Indeed, precisely  because these seismic  
changes appeared to open up  the way  to deep economic reform at home and a much 
improved relationship with the West,  there was good reason to  think they would  lay the 
foundation for greater  prosperity at home and huge economic opportunities abroad. In fact, 
for a while,  with a liberal and Democratic President in the White House calling for a  deep 
strategic partnership with Russian reform,  there looked to be  every chance that Russia would 
be able to come to terms with its much reduced  role  in world politics, not to mention its  
diminished  influence in its former imperial space.
21
 
Whether there was ever any chance of  a new cooperative relationship being built  between 
post-communist Russia and the US remains an open question.  What is not open to question  
is how quickly this early vision of a new  deal  began to lose its allure. The shift from what 
has been described as the pro-western phase in Russian thinking to something   quite different 
evolved through several stages. In simple chronological terms  however the decline in the 
relationship began as early as 1990  when the West refused large scale economic aid to 
Russia;   it  then continued after 1993 with the enlargement of NATO;  the relationship was 
further compromised as  Russian nationalists and communists began to mobilize their not 
inconsiderable base of support at home; and it was finally provided with a  more  material 
form as  the Russian economy imploded because of what many in Russia  saw as a deliberate 
western plan  to reduce the country to the status of a Third World country.  Certainly, long 
before Putin assumed office,  there was a sizeable group of Russians  who insisted  that 
having given away  everything to the West between 1989 and 1991,  Russia had got nothing 
back in return other than  broken promises and a raft  of policy suggestions that had 
impoverished the majority and allowed a narrow band of oligarchs to seize control of the 
nation’s assets.22 
In terms of  his  policies Putin did not at first seem to represent a break with those pursued by 
his predecessor Yeltsin.  But very soon it became clear that he had a strategy  of sorts  at the 
heart of  which  was a drive  to consolidate as much power in his own hands  while aligning 
his own political fortunes with those of  Russian state power.
23
   Though not  opposed to 
working with the West, or even the United States,  his basic outlook was infused with an 
underlying suspicion of the western world  and what he  appeared to view as a western desire 
to ensure that  Russia remained weak and dependent. The consequences of this  for both 
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Russia and  its near abroad – not to mention Russia’s relations with the United States and the 
European Union – were deeply significant. Putin  also added a  ‘dash of history’ to justify his 
new stance and he did this  by turning to a group of patriotic ‘Eurasianists’   who were more  
than happy to provide him with a story that best suited his purpose. At the heart of this was 
the very strong belief that Russia was not merely different to the ‘liberal’ West: the West it 
was argued was almost congenitally hostile to Russia. This had been true for the greater part 
of the 19
th
 century. It  remained true  for the whole of the Soviet period. And it continued to 
be true into the 21
st
 century.  In fact, according to Putin’s apologists (though whether Putin 
believed it himself is impossible to know)  the  end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
USSR itself were all part of a larger western plan to ensure  the West’s and the United States’  
continued  primacy. This is why 1989 and what followed in 1991 were not the progressive 
‘liberating’ events  portrayed in much western literature,    but rather well organized  regime-
changing plots  backed by certain traitors at home like Gorbachev. 
24
    
Unsurprisingly,  this  particular narrative was one that found a ready audience in  China. In 
fact,  the Chinese had been saying very much the same  ever since the collapse of Soviet  
power back  in 1989 – in part because they opposed political reform per se  and in part  
because Gorbachev’s reforms  had posed a very real danger to Chinese communist rule itself.  
Indeed, as we knew then (and have found out more since)  during that fateful year,  Beijing  
did as much as it was then possible for it  to do to prevent  the collapse happening; and,  when 
that proved impossible,   they  then took their own draconian  measures  in the June of 1989 to 
ensure that the contagion did not bring down communist rule at home. Always hostile to 
Gorbachev,  and from the outset opposed to what they viewed as  his dangerously 
destabilizing  efforts to liberalize the Soviet system – Deng later commented that even though 
Gorbachev may have looked ‘smart’ he was in fact ‘stupid’ - the Chinese had little trouble in 
agreeing with Putin’s less than positive analysis of both 1989 and the final denouement of 
Soviet power later in 1991. And why not? After all, what had happened to the USSR could 
just as  easily have happened to China itself.
25
  
In rather typical Stalinist fashion, the Communist Party then   went on to draw all sorts of 
‘lessons’ about how to make sure that what had happened to the  Soviet Union did not happen 
to China.
26
   This was not a task they took lightly.  Commissions were set up and  study 
groups created tasked with the crucial job of  explaining what had destroyed the other 
communist superpower. As  has been observed, the collapse of the Soviet Union following 
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hard on the heels of communist  collapse in Eastern Europe and East Germany ‘was a deeply 
disturbing experience for the Chinese communists’.27  It was also a deeply complicated 
problem, which might in part  explain why it took   a dozen study  groups over thirteen years 
(not to mention a 6-part documentary  series  on Chinese TV) before they could come to any 
firm conclusions.  Even then, the conclusions at which they  arrived at were not entirely  
consistent. Nor did they necessarily agree with Putin that the collapse of the Soviet Union had 
been a catastrophe. After all, once the USSR had disintegrated,  China itself no longer faced a 
united rival on its northern and eastern borders. That said, China  in the end did concede that 
what had happened contained lessons for both states: the first was that while economic  
reform might be necessary (and in China’s case, essential) one should make sure that this did 
not threaten the  integrity of the state; and the second was that one should for ever remain 
wary of the West’s intentions especially when the West – as it tended to -  dressed up its 
geostrategic  ambitions in liberal rhetoric.  Herein lay the most obvious lesson of all: namely 
that whatever else may have divided them in the past, and might divide them in the future, 
both states had a very strong interest in supporting the other against those who challenged 
their sovereign right to rule in a particular way. By so doing they would not only be protecting 
themselves  at home from dangerous ideas born in the West. They would, ironically,  also be 
upholding the fundamental Westphalian  principle  of  non-interference upon which the whole 
international system had rested for centuries and would hopefully do so for decades to come.
28
   
Hegemony and its discontents  
“China opposes hegemonism and power politics in all their forms, does not interfere in other 
countries' internal affairs and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion” Xi JinPing at 
the 18
th
 Party Congress. 2012. 
The lessons drawn from the  collapse of Soviet power  thus provided, and still provides, China 
and Russia with a common point of historical reference. But it was the  structure of the new 
international system that concerned them more. Both of  course recognized that with the 
passing of the old order  the world had changed for ever; and  both would now have to sink or 
swim in a word dominated by the market. There could be no going back to the past. On the 
other hand, the world as  seen from Beijing and Moscow was not one in which either could 
feel especially  comfortable.   For one thing,  the established  rules governing the  world  had 
all been written  by  the West. The metaphorical table  around which the main players then sat 
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was also made and designed  in the West. And sitting at  the top of the table of course was the 
established hegemon: United States.  
To add material insult to injury, in this world  the United States not only possessed a vast 
amount of  power – soft and hard -  but   an extensive alliance system as well.  Its very 
existence not only reminded  China and Russia  how few genuine friends they had 
themselves; it also contributed in significant ways  to America’s ability to place pressure on  
the two countries. The US may  have proclaimed  its  innocence,  insisting that the last thing it 
was  thinking about when it  enlarged NATO  was to encircle Russia,  or that when it tilted to 
Asia it was looking to contain China rather than  engage  it. However, that is not how things 
were viewed in either Moscow or Beijing. Indeed, for the Chinese the so-called ‘tilt’ 
(accompanied as it was by what they saw as  a change in US military doctrine)
29
 was seen as a 
highly aggressive act; and  the only legitimate response,   it  was felt,  was to  fight  fire with 
fire which  it did  with an ‘outpouring’ of  increased ‘anti-American sentiment’ in China itself   
followed up by what looked to many as a final  abandonment in practice, if not in theory,  of 
the  tried and true  Deng principle of keeping a low profile.
30
  To underscore the point, it also 
began to refer to the US less frequently  as global partner  - though such language did not 
disappear entirely from the Chinese foreign policy discourse
31
  -  and more as a potential rival 
which would for ever seek to maintain its position of primacy in Asia  through  the  
manipulation of  its still highly dependent allies. 
32
 
This in turn connects to a wider debate in which China and Russia have been engaged for 
some time about the structure of the world system after the Cold War; and one thing has 
emerged from these: neither feels that  their  interests,  singly or collectively, are best 
protected in a system in which power is so heavily concentrated in the hands of  a single  
‘hegemon’, especially when that hegemon happens to be a liberal power like  the United 
States of America.
 33
  This not only flows from their very strongly held   realist belief that 
hegemony by definition confers great status  on the hegemon. The concentration of power in 
the hands of a single power they argue  is also likely to encourage greater assertiveness. 
Clinton may have resisted the temptation for a while, though not entirely as the NATO-led 
bombing of  Kosovo showed.  But post 9/11 the situation changed dramatically, and buoyed 
up by a American public fearful of yet  another attack,  and taking full advantage of  the 
freedom afforded it by the much debated unipolar ‘moment’,  the US  launched a war on 
terror with the ostensible goal of combatting global jihad (of which the Chinese and Russians 
11 
 
approved) but with the unwritten purpose (to which they did  not)  of reasserting US power 
after what many on the republican political right saw as a post-Cold War  decade of drift.
34
 
The lesson  drawn in  China and Russia from all this were obvious: until and when the  
distribution of power in the international system had become more evenly distributed – in 
short  had become  ‘multipolar’ – then the world  would  not only remain a deeply disturbed 
place but one in which  their voice would remain marginal at best, insignificant at worst. 
35
  
China and Russia’s various efforts to challenge what they saw, and still  see,  as America’s 
global pre-eminence has also brought both into direct opposition with  what they view as 
something equally challenging: the  western idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’, or to give its 
more official title, the international community’s right to protect  individuals  when  sovereign   
states fail to uphold certain basic norms. The story of course is not a simple one. Indeed, in 
theory, neither power is by definition opposed to the basic principles of R2P. That said,  the 
two clearly feel deeply uncomfortable with the whole drift in western thinking which they 
insist allows the West to bring outside pressure to bear on what they see as recalcitrant  states.  
This, they argue,   not only undermines the UN system based  on  the  original Charter of 
1945 and the principle of sovereignty. It provides a green light for the West to force change 
from without on states with whom the West  either happens  to disagree or with whom both 
China and Russia may have significant economic and strategic relations.
36
 But this is not all. 
Their  even greater fear,  one suspects,   is that if the democratic West is given the green light 
to change or overthrow dictatorial regimes in say Iraq, Libya or Syria, this opens up the 
theoretical possibility at least of them legitimately demanding change in Russia and China as 
well. In this sense, their hostility to intervention is not just because they look at the world 
differently: it is because they worry that under the guise of advancing the rights of the human, 
or  protecting peoples from their less than perfect governments, the West could  use the 
doctrine of humanitarianism as a Trojan Horse with the purpose of weakening their own 
control at home.
37
  
This would be less important of course if either China  or Russia, or both,  happened to agree 
with the kind of values that America and  most of its allies  have sought to promote over  the 
past twenty five years. But  this is clearly not the case. Indeed, viewed from the vantage point 
of Putin’s Kremlin and or China’s leadership compound in Zhongnanhai, the values publically 
espoused by the West  look deeply problematic. It is one thing   doing business with the West. 
It is something else altogether when engagement  with the West leads as the Chinese and 
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Russians clearly fear it has, to ideological contamination. The market may be neutral 
politically, but the West as a project  is not; and faced with such a challenge  the two countries 
together have taken different, but not entirely dissimilar, counter-measures.
38
 These have 
included in the Chinese case an extensive system of censorship reinforced in the age of the 
web by a massive array of controls over what they have  defined rather ominously as 
‘information imperialism’.39 Russia may not have the same system of controls. Nevertheless, 
under Putin, the flow of information has been severely curtailed  by a media that is  now 
either completely state controlled or run by the friends of the President.  Like the Chinese the 
Russians have also spent an inordinate amount of time and effort trying to curtail flows of 
information from the outside world in an attempt  to uphold what some Russians now call 
‘internet sovereignty’.40 Those close to Putin have even spoken of the West having launched 
what they call an ‘information war’ against Russia’, one which they  have no intention of 
losing. Indeed, in one typically forceful statement (one of several) the Russian Foreign 
Minister not only linked US  aggression back to the cold war and an unreformed cold war 
mentality,  but to American exceptionalism and what he termed the belief by Americans  that 
they possessed an ‘eternal uniqueness’, one which allowed them to resist any form of external 
interference into their affairs but made it perfectly acceptable  for them to become deeply 
involved in the affairs of others.
41
  
Finally, in this  ongoing  ideological  battle against  the liberal West both China and Russia 
have tended over the years to identify any form of internal dissent with some assumed western 
plot to undermine  their respective systems. In the case of Russia the presumed link between 
opposition at home and  the machinations of some unnamed  western agencies  is now 
regularly made  in the media. Indeed,  in 2014,  a  TV programme was put out (hosted by the 
same individual who allegedly murdered Litvinenko in London) purporting to show that there 
were still many traitors in Russia, all of them – including a number of NGOs – being 
supported by (and obviously   working for)  the West. Others  are portrayed in harsher terms  
still,  most notably the Ukrainians who are  now systematically  portrayed in the wider 
Russian press as being little more than stalking horses for the Americans and their dangerous 
allies in Brussels.  China  may have adopted a somewhat (though only somewhat) less 
bellicose approach. Nonetheless, in its own ongoing  struggles against all  those who would 
challenge the idea of the ‘harmonious society’ it has rarely, if ever,  been reluctant not  to 
associate dissent at home with acts of subversion from abroad. Nor has it been backward in 
coming forward in sanctioning  those in the West whom they deem to have overstepped the  
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ideological mark – as Norway found out to its cost back in 2010 when the Nobel Peace Prize 
committee had the temerity  to   award the prize to the  jailed human rights activist, Liu 
Xiabo. Whether or not Beijing viewed the award as a western plot  remains unclear. What is 
clear is the impact it had on the official mind in China, reinforcing its basic belief  that 
western countries (even small ones like Norway) were engaged in subtle and sometimes not-
so-subtle forms of subversion whose ultimate purpose  was  political change in China. 
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Working together  
“Russia and China attach great importance to cooperation within multilateral formats, 
including the UN, G20, BRICS, the SCO” Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov. 43 
If, as I have suggested here, China and Russia adhere to a  broadly similar view of the world  
while together  asserting their right to protect  themselves  from what they both regard as that 
bearer of  ideological contamination known as the liberal West,  how has their increasingly 
close strategic partnership manifested itself  at the  international  level?  Here again the by 
now standard answer is that in spite of a certain tactical convergence on specific issues one 
should not overstate  the extent of their collaboration. Not only do big divisions remain. China  
has also become far too respectable -  too much of a ‘stakeholder’ -   to be drawn into an ever 
closer diplomatic  relationship with its less than respectable  neighbour,  especially when the 
neighbor in question has, it is argued, little to offer.
44
  Indeed, in the midst of the crisis 
occasioned by Russian intervention in Ukraine, one respected western newspaper  made a 
very direct comparison between the ‘constructive’ approach  being pursued by the Chinese 
and the ‘increasingly dangerous’  approach adopted by the Russians. It is high time, the paper 
went on, for the ‘provocative’ Russians to learn something from the more pragmatic Chinese. 
Whether Putin ever read the advice coming from the Financial Times is of course unknown. 
But one suspects that if he had, he might have wondered why the editorial made no mention 
of the  tacit support he was already receiving from the Chinese in his efforts to undermine 
Ukrainian sovereignty.  He may have also noted that the editorial also forgot to mention the 
fact that in the years leading up to the Ukrainian crisis, the apparently  ‘irresponsible’ 
Russians  and the ‘well-behaved’ Chinese  had been working increasingly closely together on 
a range of significant international issues  in a number  of  key international fora.
45
    
The first, and perhaps most important,   arena where China and Russia  had been working 
closely together was  at  the United Nations where  both occupied  seats  as Permanent 
Members of the UN Security Council. Their approaches were not identical. To be sure. 
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Indeed, China appeared to be  less willing than Russia to deploy  its veto, usually preferring to 
use the less controversial strategy of abstention when faced with resolutions it opposed.  
Moreover, on some issues involving international security (Iran’s nuclear programme for 
example) China was willing to support  measures such as sanctions. Nonetheless, like Russia, 
it  consistently resisted  the use of force by the West against  recalcitrant regimes if the 
purpose was regime change; and  more generally, opposed  any form of economic pressure  
being applied to  states deemed  to be guilty of human rights abuses. The record speaks for 
itself. Thus in 2006, it effectively prevented any action being taken against Sudan over its 
genocidal behaviour in Darfur. In 2007 it  then stymied the UN over  Myanmar. And a year 
later, it acted once again to protect Mugabe’s Zimbabwe from censure.  But more was to 
follow when China with Russia together and repeatedly vetoed UN motions  aimed to censure  
Russia’s close (and only) ally in the Middle East,  Syria. In 2011 for example both vetoed a 
resolution condemning the Syrian regime’s  handling of anti-government street protests. A 
year later they vetoed an Arab League Plan calling for political change. Resolutions calling 
for sanctions against Assad were also vetoed, as was a UN draft resolution in May 2014  
backed by 65 countries calling for the crisis in Syria  to be referred to the International 
Criminal Court.
46
   And so it went on, causing something close to a storm in the UN  and the 
wider Arab world. One writer even accused the two of  ‘kneecapping’ the Security Council.47  
But all to no avail. In fact, at a 2014 meeting in Beijing, the two  both appeared to be 
congratulate the other for having prevented a western intervention which in their view would 
not only have made matters much worse, but would have undermined any moves toward a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict.   
If increased political co-operation in the United Nations points to  more than just a 
coincidental  meeting of minds over specific issues, then  China and Russia’s formal 
membership of the sometimes underestimated -  and often understudied -  Shanghai Co-
operation Organization or SCO  points to something  of equal significance: a proven longer 
term ability  to cooperate in matters relating  to hard security. Of course, the SCO was not, 
and was never intended to be,  the Eurasian  equivalent  of NATO. However, over time it soon 
became  more than the sum of its disparate parts. A Chinese initiative in the first instance with 
the purpose of  promoting some degree of regional co-ordination where  before there had been 
none, the SCO  has since its foundation in 2001 taken on several roles which  now  include  a 
counter-terrorism function, a  sharing of intelligence, and an  increasingly high degree of 
military co-operation – especially between China and Russia.48  
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Initially, China  was  keen to stress that even if no western power was  likely to play a role in 
the organization   this did not mean that its purpose was anti-western or anti-American as 
such. However, even if the SCO sought ‘no open confrontation’ with the US,  it was difficult  
to think  of the SCO not having  some broader strategic purpose, especially after 9/11 when 
the US  began  to  increase its presence in Central Asia. This certainly worried the ever 
sensitive Chinese, though given their own concerns about terrorism they were prepared to 
concede some temporary US presence. The Russians too conceded some US role for the time 
being. But  as time passed, the Russian position changed.  Indeed, the longer the US remained 
in Central Asia,   the more concerned  the Russians became with what they saw as an 
American attempt  to establish a long-term presence in countries that had once formed part of 
the USSR. In the end, things came to a head and in July 2005  it managed to get its SCO 
partners – including China - to demand of the West and the US that they remove their  forces 
from SCO members’ territories. They in turn  linked this specific demand  to a wider debate  
about  the kind of international system they sought and the role the SCO might play in 
creating a new ‘world order’, one  in which no single power (here meaning the United States) 
would  have a ‘monopoly in world affairs’ or be able arrogate to itself the right to interfere ‘in 
the internal affairs of sovereign states’. Furthermore, at its various meetings China and Russia  
started to behave  as if the SCO formed the kernel of a powerful new security organization 
constructed on  principles very different to those found in the  liberal and democratic West.  
Underwritten politically  by what has become known as the ‘Shanghai spirit’ with its  strong 
emphasis on non-interference, stability and diversity,  the SCO thus soon came to  form  part 
of  wider  Chinese and Russian strategy with the purpose of establishing deeper co-operation 
between the two powers. Of course, the SCO still only has a limited impact on the security 
situation in Eurasia more generally; and  the  organization it is accepted has been unable to 
‘sustain or even execute many of the agreements it reaches at meetings due to conflicting national 
regulations, laws, and standards’. There are also ongoing complaints that some  SCO members have 
so far  been unwilling to ‘supply the collective SCO bodies’ with the resources necessary to make 
them function  effectivelu.49 That said,  a body which did not exist some time ago exists today; 
and it exists  with  the broad overarching purpose of allowing  both Russia and China to find a 
united and separate voice in a part of the world  from which they seek to minimize or even 
exclude the  Americans.  
If  both China and Russia have invested much into  maintaining and strengthening  SCO as a 
regional security organization, the same could just as easily be said of an even more famous 
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entity   which started life back in November 2001. 
50
  Initially, of course, even the idea of the 
BRICS  was  pooh-poohed by most conventional economists; and even after it had begun to 
take  on a life of its own, there were still those who repeated  the  line  that the  countries who 
constituted the BRICS  were  just  too different to be viewed  as a united  bloc. Even so, the 
simple idea of the BRICS  not only  helped redefine the way many people  came to see  the 
world - contributing in no small part to the notion that power was  shifting  away from the 
West – the BRICs themselves began to take on an institutional  life of their own. Indeed, 
something which had only started  out as being an  acronym gradually morphed into 
something more tangible following the financial crash of 2008.
51
   Certainly, since its first 
summit in 2009 the BRICS has assumed ever greater importance; and within the BRICS 
organization itself China and Russia have worked closely together fashioning common 
positions  attacking in one breath western-style  structural reforms,  and then, in another,  the 
unequal character of the world’s financial system and the privileged role  enjoyed by  the US 
dollar. They have been  equally vocal  on  global governance issues,  arguing that the current  
distribution of  voting power on the IMF and the World Bank is much too  heavily weighted 
in favour of the Europeans and the Americans. But not  only have they been strongly critical 
of the West. At the  Brazil summit in 2014 the two also helped the BRICS establish two 
financial bodies (including one Bank)  which  would, they hoped,  challenge the primacy of 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Now whether or not these various 
efforts could ever weaken, let alone undermine  the West’s  grip on the levers of financial 
power was not at all clear. Still, it was not without significance (or irony) that a body that had 
been invented in the West by a western economist, many years later looked like it was now 
providing  both China and Russia with a platform from which they were able to launch  rather 
effective  criticisms  of  western practices.
52
 
Of course the BRICS,  like the SCO,  is still a work in progress. But in spite of the problems 
currently facing some of its members, what may once have been  defined (and dismissed) as  
a  mere ‘club’ has over time taken steps towards becoming something more. 53  Perhaps there is no 
clear idea yet of  what each of the five members want the BRICS to become; and there are   real 
worries too about the current state of at least one of them (Brazil). Nonetheless, a body that was for the 
first few years of its existence virtually ignored or simply written off, has assumed a significance that 
few would ever have believed possible. Nor should we make the mistake (as some are now doing) of 
confusing the economic challenges facings individual BRIC  countries today with its demise as a 
body. Take China. It has no illusions about its own  economic problems. Nevertheless,  it would be 
quite wrong to think that it views the BRIC relationship  as some sort of sideshow whose importance 
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is bound to fade over time.
54
 If this were the case it is difficult to understand   why at the last party 
Congress it was picked out as one of the most important pillars in the creation of a more multilateral 
and multipolar world. It would also be impossible to explain  why China more than anybody else has 
been urging other BRIC countries to play an  even more active role within it. And it not just China 
alone. India too continues to  view the organization as an important vehicle, not only in terms of 
encouraging co-operation between the BRICs themselves, but also as a vehicle for enhancing its own 
international status. Russia is in little doubt either about the continued value of the BRICs both as an 
economic body, but  even more significantly as a geopolitical counterweight to the West – one that  
also happens to  confer upon Russia something which  the West in its view never will:  recognition as 
an equal in an international system in dire need of reform.
55
  
Finally, in any assessment of the China –Russian relationship one should not underestimate 
the importance of wider trade questions relating to the Asia Pacific region. Indeed, in what 
has rapidly become a  battle between the United States and China over which body should 
define the trade  agenda around the Pacific, it is not insignificant that Russia has rushed into 
support China – which favours APEC – while  taking  great exception  to  American efforts  
to establish its own parallel organization in the shape of the TPP.
56
 Not only has it done so 
because  both countries were at first excluded from TPP. It  has acted thus because like China 
it seeks to thwart America’s much vaunted ‘tilt to Asia’ of which TPP is seen as  being a vital 
part.  Making its own very strong claim to be as much an Asian power as a European one – 
some have even talked of a Russian tilt to Asia -  Russia  has  certainly been highly active on 
the diplomatic  front of late.  Indeed, at the APEC summit hosted by the Chinese in Beijing in 
November 2014 it could not have been more active or Putin more vocal.  It was quite  
‘obvious’, Putin noted in one interview,  that the  Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was 
nothing more than ‘just another American attempt to build an architecture of regional 
economic co-operation’ from which  the US in particular  ‘would benefit’. But the effort 
would fail he continued,   and would do so  in large part because the Americans had gone out 
of their way to exclude ‘two regional players’ in the shape of Russia and China. Thus having 
stressed the dubious motives of the Americans,  Putin then emphasized how close Russia now 
was to China,  noting that ‘relations between the two countries’  had  never been better. 
Indeed, according to Putin, they had ‘reached the highest level’ in  our ‘entire history’.57 The 
Chinese President did not appear to digress from this assessment. Nor did the official Chinese 
press who continued to rail against what they saw as an  American-led strategy of  returning  
to Asia by opening  ‘the door’ to the Asian  ‘market’ as part of an even wider, and more 
insidious,  effort  to encircle  China itself.
58
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Of course, this jaundiced view of US policy was strongly denied by officials in Washington;  
and indeed at the same APEC summit  -and at later fora in 2015 and 2016 - Obama went out 
of his way to stress that the TPP was definitely not an ‘anyone but China club’.59  Indeed, in 
2015 he even invited Russia and China to join.  But neither the Russian leadership or the 
Chinese seemed to be won over. Indeed, Putin  continued to see all this as part of a larger 
American  plan to either undermine or surround Russia , even though some Russian analysts 
argued that  TPP might have positive results for the country. 
60
. The Chinese president 
appeared to be equally aggrieved, even though certain reformers in China appeared to be in 
favour of joining. 
61
 Either way, both stuck to the original  official line that TPP was a direct 
challenge, and that the only thing  that could hold it back (aside from opposition to it coming 
from the American people themselves!) was an ever  closer partnership between a  China that 
was more than happy to have Russia making the case against America on its behalf, and a 
Russia that was now more keen than ever to strengthen its ties  with China in  a period when 
its own relations with the West had moved from being poor to bad to near disastrous 
following events in Ukraine.
62
  
Conclusion  
“China does not want the South China Sea dominated by Americans. Russia does not want 
the West — the United States and Europe — to penetrate what Moscow perceives as ‘its 
sphere of influence.’ In short, Russia and China do not want a world dominated by the United 
States”63 
Though the crisis in Ukraine might be seen as being the immediate cause of what some are 
now claiming, rather spuriously,  is  a “new” Cold  War between Russia and the West, its 
deeper origins  can be  traced back to the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 and the 
traumatic effect this then had on Russian power and  Russian identity. 
64
 Squeezed, as Russia 
then felt  that it was,   between on the one hand  an unsympathetic and predatory  West 
determined to spread its liberal values, and on the other by a rising tide of nationalist  
sentiment in its former republics,  Russia was bound, in the end, to try and call a halt to what 
Putin came to see as the country’s precipitate decline. The material foundation for this  was in 
the first instance provided by a near ten-fold increase in the price of oil and gas.  But Russia’s 
rebooting also took a more  direct form, firstly in Georgia in 2008 when it intervened directly 
to punish  a Georgian government looking westwards towards NATO, and then, more 
seriously,   in 2013, when Ukraine took what now looks like a tipping point decision to  
establish a much closer relationship  with  the European Union. What followed is by now 
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well-known with revolt breaking out in Kiev, Russia’s chosen political  proxy in Ukraine 
taking flight,  Crimea then seceding from Ukraine, followed in turn by  ongoing Russian-
inspired interventions in East and South-East Ukraine. 
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As we now know, this  unprecedented crisis not only had a major impact on Russia’s 
relationship with the West. It also posed a serious problem for China. Naturally  enough 
Beijing was following these events  with enormous interest, fully aware that what Russia had 
done and was doing –  organizing a secession and then continuing to interfere into the internal 
affairs of another  state – ran directly counter its own cherished foreign policy principles. 
Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that some Chinese officials   heartily disapproved 
(in private) of Russian actions. Moreover, Beijing (to be fair)  did issue  a number statements 
which though not directly critical of Russia,   did repeat their by now standard foreign policy 
position  that matters should be settled through negotiation not force and that all parties to the 
conflict should recognize each other’s’ sovereign rights But to many observers this looked 
like so much window dressing. Indeed, while Russian-led or Russian-backed forces continued 
to operate in southern and eastern Ukraine, an admittedly  coy China seemed to be doing quite 
a bit in the background either to protect Moscow  from serious  criticism - significantly China 
abstained in the subsequent UN Security Council vote on a resolution condemning the 
referendum in Crimea - or to explain away Russian behavior altogether.  In fact, as the crisis 
unfolded, China  appeared to suggest that if anybody was to blame it was not so much  their 
close friend Putin,  but rather a meddling West that had  failed to understand history or the 
‘complexities of the Ukrainian  issue’.  One analyst even blamed the whole crisis on the West 
for having enlarged NATO. Moreover, according to the same source, Ukraine really belonged 
to Russia in much the same way as Taiwan belonged to China.  Indeed, for the Russians,  he 
went on,   ‘the loss of Ukraine’ would be  ‘even more serious than if China were to lose Taiwan’.66   
China’s   diplomatic attempts to sound even-handed  in public, while scolding the West for 
acting irresponsibly, undoubtedly  helped the Russians in their moment of diplomatic need. 
China meanwhile took full advantage of the situation to enhance its own position. Certainly, 
the much vaunted gas deal signed in May was one that worked to China’s advantage. As Putin 
himself later confessed, the Chinese had driven a particularly hard bargain.  Nor did the drive 
to improve economic relations end there. Indeed, as if to make the point even ‘clearer than the 
truth’ to those who may have been wondering about the health of the relationship,  the two  
countries went on to  sign  yet another energy deal in November, followed by further 
negotiations over the next eighteen months. It is true, of course,  that the various agreements 
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came nowhere to delivering on  their early promise.  But as others pointed out, new  deals had 
been struck where there had been no new deals before. Nor did the drive to improve relations 
end there. Only a few months after Putin had  signed a law formally incorporating Crimea into 
Russia, Russia and China signed a   major new arms agreement involving the Russian  
transfer of some of its very  best aircraft technology. In April of the following year,  Russia  
then sold China its most advanced  Surface-to-Air missiles (the S-400) in what was reported 
at the time to be ‘the largest Sino-Russian arms deal in over a decade’.67 This in turn was 
followed a month later by their first ever joint naval exercise together in the Eastern 
Mediterranean (another even bigger one took place five months later). And in  August of 2015 the two 
countries conducted what was claimed to be their ‘largest ever naval exercise in the Pacific’. 68 
Certainly, if China was feeling uncomfortable in supporting Russia over Ukraine, as some western 
analysts suggested at the time, it was certainly not showing.
 69 
Naturally enough, none of this seemed to make much difference to those who had always 
doubted the staying power of the relationship. Thus a short while after China and Russia had 
signed the new gas deal,  one analyst was still reassuring his readers that the relationship was 
still ‘more superficial than strategic’. 70 A  few months later and another pundit was claiming 
that the Russian and Chinese leaders were not really ‘buddies’. 71  By the beginning of 2015,  
yet another  writer was suggesting  that even if China and Russia might  have looked like they 
were getting on extraordinarily well,  the economic relationship with China could not deliver 
what Russia really needed.
72
 And by September we were being told that their friendship was 
once again facing new stresses and strains as the Chinese economy slowed and oil prices 
tumbled. 
73
 Yet in spite of all the jeremiads and dire predictions that the relationship was 
about to take a tumble, nothing of the sort happened. Indeed, as we have seen, far from 
stuttering or coming to a halt,   the relationship  became more entrenched still, as indeed the 
two leaders of the two countries openly confessed. As Putin made clear - and Xi did not 
demur -  the continued ‘expansion of the Russian-Chinese partnership’ met and presumably 
would continue to ‘ meet the interests and strategic goals  of our two countries’.74  
The question then remains: how might the relationship evolve in the future? The sceptics 
obviously think, and continue to insist,  that underlying tensions  will in the end  make the 
relationship – whose significance they doubt anyway - either less important or undermine it 
altogether. But this is certainly not a view supported by the evidence at the moment. Nor is 
there much to suggest they will be pulling apart  any time soon. Indeed, why should they? 
After all, the relationship has already realized major strategic and political gains for the two 
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sides. It has provided both with important diplomatic cover at crucial moments. It has led to 
increased political and military co-operation (if not a formal military alliance). And though 
there are still important problems in the economic relationship, it is worth recalling that 
whereas trade back in the 1990s was negligible, by 2016 China  had already   become 
Russia’s single biggest trade partner and Russia an important source of energy for China.  
More important still, the partnership permitted the two  to confront together what  both agreed 
was their biggest joint problem: namely, an American-led global alliance which not only tried 
to  limit   their ambitions, but put into doubt the  very legitimacy of  their respective regimes. 
Theoretically,  things  could change of course. For instance, the two countries could both 
adopt western  style human rights reforms. Russia and China could come to accept the 
international order as it is. Russia could stop acting in the way it has been acting in Ukraine. 
The West could accept the annexation of Crimea. China could give up on its goals in the East 
and South China seas. It might even accept that the United States  has a  right to be an Asian 
power. But  the chances of any of this happening  are virtually nil. The scene is thus set for a 
continued stand off,  one consequence of which will be to reinforce the belief in Moscow and 
Beijing that in a hostile international environment, one should stick close to one’s friends  
(however imperfect they may be) because in  an insecure world such friends (warts and all) 
are  central to achieving what both are still striving to achieve: namely, greater political 
security at home, fewer obstacles to their ambitions in their own neighborhood, and a more 
equal world system in which the United States and its allies have less control over what 
happens. So long as they continue to share these basic goals – and there is no reason to think 
these are going to change any time soon - there  is every chance the two will continue to travel 
along the  same, sometimes rocky,   path  they have been moving along together  since the 
beginning of the twenty first century. 
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